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Abstract
In this paper, we give a sharp estimate of a trigonometric sum which has several applications
in cryptography and sequence theory. Using this estimate, we deduce new lower bounds on
the nonlinearity of Carlet–Feng function, which has very good cryptographic properties with
its nonlinearity bound being improved in numerous papers, as well as the function proposed
by Tang–Carlet–Tang.
Keywords Carlet–Feng function · Tang–Carlet–Tang function · Trigonometric sum ·
Nonlinearity
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1 Introduction
To resist the main known attacks, Boolean functions used in stream ciphers should be bal-
anced, have high algebraic degree, high algebraic immunity, high nonlinearity and good
immunity to fast algebraic attacks. It is known that constructing Boolean functions satisfying
all these criteria is not an easy task.
Many classes of Boolean functionswith optimumalgebraic immunity had been introduced
[2,9,12,13,24,25,30,32]. However, the nonlinearity of these functions is not good, and we
do not know whether they can behave well against fast algebraic attacks. In 2008, Carlet
and Feng [6] studied a class of functions which had been introduced by [14], and they
found that these functions seem to satisfy all of the mentioned cryptographic criteria [6].
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This is a breakthrough in the field of cryptographic Boolean functions. Based on the Carlet–
Feng construction, some researchers proposed several classes of cryptographically significant
Boolean functions [33,34,36,37,41,43].
To resist fast correlation attacks and linear approximation attacks [16,28], Boolean func-
tions used in stream ciphers should have high nonlinearity. The maximum nonlinearity of
n-variable Boolean functions is the same as the covering radius of the first order Reed–Muller
code RM(1, n), which is bounded above by 2n−1−2n/2−1, and a function is bent if it achieves
this bound [8,15]. For n odd, the nonlinearity is upper bounded by 22n−2 − 2n/2−2 [21].
For odd n ≤ 7, it is known that the maximum nonlinearity is equal to the bent concatenation
bound 2n−1 − 2(n−1)/2 [1,18,29]. However, for odd n > 7, the covering radius of RM(1, n)
is still unknown [19,20,22,23,31]. For the maximum possible higher-order nonlinearities, we
refer to [3,7,10,38,42].
From the cryptographic point of view, Boolean functions need to be balanced. It is still an
open problem whether the maximum possible nonlinearity of 8-variable balanced functions
is 118. We refer to [35] for more results on the nonlinearity of balanced functions. If we want
Boolean functions to be cryptographically significant, e.g, balanced, with optimum algebraic
immunity and good immunity to fast algebraic attacks, the problem of finding the maximum
possible nonlinearity is still far away to be solved.
Using a Gauss sum, Carlet and Feng deduced a lower bound on the nonlinearity of the











Using the same method, several improved bounds have been deduced in [5,17,36,39,41,43]
by estimating the same sum Sn .
In 2013, Tang et al. [36] proposed two classes of Boolean functions with good crypto-
graphic properties. They deduced a lower bound on the nonlinearity which is larger than all
previously introduced bounds for similar functions. The key method in finding that bound
relied yet again on an estimate of the above sum Sn .
It is of interest to give a sharp estimate of Sn and thus the best possible nonlinearity bound
derived through this trigonometric sum. However, if we want to improve the bound further,
then one must use a different method than the one based upon a trigonometric sum.
Moreover, the trigonometric sum Sn has applications in sequence theory, as well. For
example, it can be used to investigate the imbalance properties of LFSR subsequences [40].
In this paper, we give a very precise estimate of Sn and prove that
0.36















π(2n − 1) .
Using these inequalities, we deduce new lower bounds on the nonlinearity of the Carlet–Feng
function and the function proposed by [36].
2 Preliminaries
Let F2n the finite field of dimension n over the binary field F2. We denote by Bn the set of all
n-variable Boolean functions fromF2n into F2. Any Boolean function f ∈ Bn (with the usual
123
A trigonometric sum sharp estimate and new bounds
identification of the finite field F2n with the vector space Fn2) can be uniquely represented as
a multivariate polynomial in F2[x1, . . . , xn],







which is called the algebraic normal form (ANF). The algebraic degree of f , denoted by
deg( f ), is the number of variables in the highest order term with nonzero coefficient. Let
1 f = {x ∈ F2n | f (x) = 1} be the support of a Boolean function f , whose cardinality |1 f |
is called the Hamming weight of f . The Hamming distance between two functions f and g,
denoted by d( f , g), is the Hamming weight of f + g. Let f ∈ Bn . The nonlinearity [4,11]
of f is
nl( f ) = min
deg(g)≤1 d( f , g).
TheWalsh-Hadamard transform of a given function f ∈ Bn is the integer-valued function
over F2n defined by




whereω ∈ F2n and tr(x) denotes the absolute trace function fromF2n toF2. The nonlinearity
of f can then be determined by





3 New bounds on the nonlinearity of some cryptographically
significant Boolean functions
Nonlinearity is a quite important cryptographic criterion of Boolean functions in designing
stream ciphers and block ciphers, which is desired to be as high as possible. It is still far away
to be solved that what is the maximum possible nonlinearity of cryptographically significant
Boolean functions. In the following, we will deduce new lower bounds on the nonlinearity
of cryptographically significant Boolean functions.
3.1 New bound on the nonlinearity of the Carlet–Feng function
The Carlet–Feng function CF ∈ Bn is defined as the function with support
1CF = {0, 1, α, α2, . . . , α2n−1−2},
whereα ∈ F2n is a primitive element. It is known that theCarlet–Feng function has quite good
cryptographic properties: balancedness, high algebraic degree, high algebraic immunity, high
nonlinearity and good immunity to fast algebraic attacks [6,27].
Using a Gauss sum, Carlet and Feng [6] proved that
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they deduced a lower bound on nl(CF). After that, many improved bounds have been found
by estimating the same sum [17,36,41,43].
In this section, we will give a very precise estimate of this sum Sn . Our estimate relies on
Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2, whose proofs are included in the Appendix.























































By Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2, we can then prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3 For n ≥ 8, we have
0.36
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Table 1 Comparison of the bounds on nl(CF)
n Bound in [6] Bound in [17] Bound in [36] Our bound Exact value
8 70 79 86 92 112
10 366 396 416 426 484
12 1700 1780 1830 1848 1970
14 7382 7584 7700 7735 8036
16 30922 31409 31673 31741 32530
18 126927 128068 128658 128792 130442
20 515094 517704 519010 519277 523154
22 2076956 2082834 2085694 2086225 2094972
24 8344600 8357672 8363886 8364947 8384536






















π(2n − 1) .





















π(2n − 1) ,
and the result follows. 

By (1), we then have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.4 For n ≥ 8, we have














2n − 1 .
Remark 3.5 The lower bound on nl(CF) in Theorem 3.4 improves upon known bounds.
In Table 1, we display the comparison of our bound with the previously known ones. By
Theorem 3.3, using the standard Gauss sum method, it seems that one cannot improve upon
our lower bound on nl(CF).
We note that there still exists a big gap between our bound and the exact value. However,
our bound is the best possible deduced through the trigonometric sum and our estimates. If
one wants to improve the bound further, one must use a different method, i.e., not through
the trigonometric sum.
3.2 New bound on the nonlinearity of the function constructed by
Tang–Carlet–Tang
Let n = 2k ≥ 4 and α be a primitive element of F2k . Let
s = {αs, . . . , α2k−1+s−1}, 0 ≤ s < 2k − 1.
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Let g be the function of support s . The function T TC ∈ Bn introduced by Tang–Carlet–
Tang in [36] is defined by
T TC(x, y) = g(xy).
This function has optimal algebraic immunity, good immunity to fast algebraic attacks and
high algebraic degree. Tang et al. deduced a lower bound on the nonlinearity which is larger
than all previously introduced bounds for similar functions. In the following, we will find a
new lower bound on nl(T TC).
We let q = 2k . Let χ be the primitive character of F∗q defined by χ(α j ) = ζ j (0 ≤ j ≤






χμ(x)(−1)tr(x), 0 ≤ μ ≤ 2k − 2
be the Gauss sum [26] (recall that tr is the absolute trace of Fq over F2). By [36], we have











−ν q2 − 1
ζ−ν − 1 .
Theorem 3.6 For k ≥ 8, we have
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π(q − 1) .
Therefore,






















































and the theorem is shown. 





























That is, using the standard Gauss sum method, our lower bound on nl(T TC) cannot be
further improved.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we give a very precise estimate of a trigonometric sum. Using that estimate, we
deduce new lower bounds on the nonlinearity of the Carlet–Feng function and the function
proposed by Tang et al. [36].
Acknowledgements QichunWangwould like to thank the financial support from theNational Natural Science
Foundation of China (Grant 61572189).
Appendix: Proof of Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2
In order to prove Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2, we introduce a function g(x) = 1sin x − 1x , which we





observe that limx→0 g′(x) = 16 and g′( π4 ) = 16π2 −
√
2. Further,





, g′′′(x) = − (5 + cos





Using standard methods from calculus, it is easy to prove that g′′′(x) > 0, for 0 < x < π .






.Our idea of the proof is as follows.
































































g(x)dx, 0 ≤ t ≤ π
N
,
we can give a precise estimate of T2 by estimating those terms in (4), and then a precise
estimate of T1 can be deduced. The proof of Lemma 3.2 is similar.
The following four lemmas estimate those terms in (4) one by one.
























































Proof Clearly, for 0 ≤ t ≤ πN , we have












































































































































































and the result follows. 





















Proof Let F1(t) = tg(t) −
∫ t








































2 sin2( π2N ) − π2 cos( π2N )





































and the result follows. 
































g(x)dx , where 0 ≤ t ≤ 3π4N . Clearly, F2(0) = 0 and
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− cos(
π
4 + 3π4N )












2(cos 3π4N − sin 3π4N )
















− √2 + 0.45
N
,
and the result follows. 









































sin 3π4N − 2 sin2 3π8N
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sin 3π4N − 2 sin2 3π8N




























and the result follows. 

Those terms in (4) have been estimated by the above four lemmas. We then can give a
proof for Lemma 3.1.



























































































































































































2k − 1 <
1
2
ln(N + 1) + γ
2
+ 1









< ln(N + 1) + γ + 2


























Similarly, we can prove the left inequality of Lemma 3.1, and the result follows. 

To prove Lemma 3.2, we need two more lemmas.




















































The proof of Lemma A.5 is quite similar to the proof of Lemma A.1, so we omit it here.
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12(N − 1)2 +
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(N − 1)2 +
8
3(N − 1)3 ,
and the result follows. 

We then can give a proof for Lemma 3.2.


























































































































































































N − 2k < ln 2 −
2
N + 1 −
2.46















< ln 2 − 2
N + 1 −
2.46























Similarly, we can show the left inequality of Lemma 3.2, and the result follows. 
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